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I

n 2007, Vermont enacted the Prescription Confidentiality Law, prohibiting pharmacies from selling “prescriber-identifiable” prescription information to data-mining companies such as IMS Health
and Verispan. These companies
aggregate such data and sell
them to many groups, including
drug companies, so when drug
sales representatives visit a physician, they can know exactly what
prescriptions the physician has
written.
The companies, joined by the
trade association Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of
America, sued Vermont to block
the law. Vermont won in federal
district court but lost on appeal.
In June, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Sorrell v. IMS Health,1 holding six-to-three against Vermont.
As Mello and Messing describe,
the decision considers drug marketing using prescriber-identifiable

prescription data to be speech protected by the First Amendment,
and it implicates similar New
Hampshire and Maine laws and
a Massachusetts regulation.
Vermont’s statute had a fatal
self-inflicted wound. By prominently announcing that the state
intended to tip the balance in the
“marketplace for ideas” against
drug companies, the law dug itself into a constitutional hole:
state interference with that marketplace was likely to provoke the
ire of a majority of the Supreme
Court. Writing for the Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy stated,
“[t]he more benign and, many
would say, beneficial speech of
pharmaceutical marketing is also
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entitled to the protection of the
First Amendment.”
Instead of dealing with this
statute under existing precedent,
Kennedy seized the opportunity
to expand the First Amendment’s
reach and power to strike down
government regulation of health
care information. The Court’s
opinion raises serious questions
for some public health rules and
the regulation of drug marketing. Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in dissent, charged that the
Court added an unprecedented
constitutional standard that would
hinder consumer-protection regulations, including Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) restrictions
against off-label marketing.
Although the First Amendment’s core is the protection of
religious freedom and political
speech, in recent decades, federal
courts have expanded its application to business-related or “com-
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mercial” speech. In the 1970s, the
Court used the commercial speech
doctrine to reach state laws
prohibiting advertising by professionals such as lawyers, accountants, pharmacists, and physicians. These professions had been
self-regulating, following ethical
rules that limited market competition. The Supreme Court struck
down the prohibitions, using a
standard of review that reserved
some deference to the state legislature. By 1980, this “intermediate-scrutiny” standard was encapsulated in the Central Hudson
decision, and until now, the Central Hudson test — whereby it’s
considered constitutional to regulate commercial speech only if
doing so “directly advances” a
“substantial” government interest
in a way that “is not more extensive than is necessary” — has
been the operative standard.
Kennedy applied a more stringent “heightened-scrutiny” standard to the Vermont law, seeing
the additional burden as justified
because the law regulated specific conduct (drug marketing) and
specific persons (data miners and
drug companies). Under this standard, the Court didn’t carefully
weigh the health care cost savings described by Vermont and
gave short shrift to physicians’
confidentiality in patient-related
decision making, claiming that
prescriber-identifiable information was widely available in the
marketplace. The majority dismissed Vermont’s concerns about
data mining as “nothing more
than a difference of opinion,”
without considering seriously the
peer-reviewed evidence on marketing’s effect on prescribing
choices. Indeed, experts’ testimony to the Vermont legislature
was offered as evidence of the
state’s bias.
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Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public Health Regulation

In his dissent, Breyer noted
that many well-established FDA
regulations could fall if heightened scrutiny were applied. In
fact, it’s difficult to identify an
FDA regulation that does not target specific conduct and specific
persons. For example, the FDA
restricts off-label promotion by
drug and device companies,2 and
regulations specifically target food
and cigarette advertising. And indeed, drug companies have recently raised First Amendment
challenges to enforcement actions
against off-label promotion.3 In
a prominent case involving Allergan’s promotion of onabotulinum
toxin A (Botox) for unapproved
indications including headache,
pain, muscle spasticity, and cerebral palsy in children,4 one of
Allergan’s defenses was a First
Amendment challenge against the
regulation prohibiting off-label
promotion. Ultimately, Allergan
pled guilty to a misdemeanor
misbranding charge and paid the
U.S. government $600 million,
but in announcing this settlement,
the company expressed regret that
the First Amendment issue had
not been litigated to a final conclusion. After Sorrell, we can expect similar challenges to FDA
marketing rules. In fact, Allergan
and six other pharmaceutical and
device companies recently filed a
petition calling for clarifications
of the FDA’s regulation of offlabel promotion and warning that
“important constitutional concerns arise out of the regulatory
scheme.”
In Sorrell, the Court suggested
that the Constitution might
be more flexible regarding FDA
regulations protecting consumers rather than physicians. The
Court reaffirmed that “The First
Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that
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seek to keep people in the dark
for what the government perceives to be their own good. . . .
These precepts apply with full
force when the audience, in this
case prescribing physicians, consists of ‘sophisticated and experienced’ consumers.” Thus, FDA
regulation of direct-to-consumer
advertising could be given more
leeway than marketing to physicians, especially if medical education programs focused on
helping physicians evaluate such
claims. Similarly, more leeway
could be given under special circumstances, such as if the FDA
restricted direct-to-consumer advertising as part of a Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy.
Outside the pharmaceutical
realm, this decision also bodes
ill for marketing regulation of
food, tobacco, alcohol, and other products with important public health effects. Kennedy’s opinion notes that “the State may not
seek to remove a popular but disfavored product from the marketplace by prohibiting truthful, nonmisleading advertisements that
contain impressive endorsements
or catchy jingles. That the State
finds expression too persuasive
does not permit it to quiet the
speech or to burden its messengers.” One could surmise from
this position that cigarette manufacturers might have a First
Amendment right to broadcast
TV advertisements or target young
prospective smokers with cartoons. By contrast, regulations requiring additional speech — such
as menu and food-labeling laws
— might better survive First
Amendment review.
With respect to data mining,
states have several options going
forward. The majority opinion provides a road map for a law focused on patient privacy. States

nejm.org

The New England Journal of Medicine
Downloaded from nejm.org at BOSTON UNIVERSITY on April 15, 2022. For personal use only. No other uses without permission.
Copyright © 2011 Massachusetts Medical Society. All rights reserved.

PERSPECTIVE

may supplement the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the federal
privacy statute, to add protections
for prescriber-identifiable data.
The Court indicated that HIPAA
would survive a First Amendment
challenge: “For instance, the State
might have advanced its asserted
privacy interest by allowing the
information’s sale or disclosure
in only a few narrow and welljustified circumstances. . . .
A statute of that type would present quite a different case than
the one presented here.” Under
HIPAA, Vermont has authority to
adopt such an amendment.
One major factual disagreement on the Court relates to the
breadth of exceptions under the
Vermont law: the majority thought
prescriber-identifiable data were
ubiquitous in the marketplace,
whereas Breyer believed the law
operated more like HIPAA, with
such data assumed to be confidential unless a clear exception
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applies. Under HIPAA, the state
could extend the federal Privacy
Rule to cover prescriber-identifiable data in Vermont, and the
Supreme Court would apparently
approve.
In addition, as Vermont transitions to single-payer health care,
Green Mountain Care will become the sole authority contracting with all providers. Vermont
could use Green Mountain Care’s
pharmacy–provider contracts to
restrict the sale of prescriberidentifiable data without running
afoul of the First Amendment.
Similarly, other public and private
health plans could refuse to sign
contracts with pharmacies that
sell prescriber-identifiable data.
The commercial speech doctrine is a modern invention. In
1942, the Supreme Court unanimously held that whereas the
First Amendment protected political protest, “the Constitution
imposes no such restraint on
government as respects purely
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commercial advertising.”5 Today’s
Court has come to a quite different conclusion, raising new
constitutional hurdles for myriad FDA and public health regulations.
Disclosure forms provided by the author
are available with the full text of this article at NEJM.org.
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